Uncommon sense

“Common sense would thus become uncommon sense.” (Bill’s Story)

If it is God’s will, it does not need to make sense. There is no reason why what is right will make sense to an individual who (a) does not have all the facts and (b) whose reason is compromised in more than one way. (a) and (b) apply to all people at all times. Whenever I seek to justify what I believe to be God’s will with reference to reason, I am really saying I do not trust the process of seeking God’s will at all. I am suggesting that, if my reason were to find a course of action to be irrational, I would conclude that it is not God’s will. If I am really trusting God’s will, my assessment of whether or not it is rational is valueless.

If a course of action is warranted by virtue of reason (and rejected if it does not mean this test), I am really relying on reason, not on God, and God is entirely left out of it. The test is this: if something appears to be God’s will, and I test it against reason, and it does not make sense, and I conclude it is not God’s will, I am not seeking to do God’s will at all: I am seeking to do what I think is rational, and I am merely using the ascertainment of God’s will as a sort of Magic 8 Ball to come up with one or more candidates for the right course of action, and the candidates themselves have no value by virtue of their origin in God unless coincidentally rational. The divine origin thus falls away as a certificate of validity and we are left only with reason. This is atheistic divination masquerading as a combination of piety and reason, when it is neither pious nor rational.

The fact that reasoning and revelation are incompatible as grounds on which to adopt a course of action has the same logic as the relationship between cause and effect and the impossibility of multiple independent causes.

If I think what I think because my brain biochemically and electrically programs me to think what I think, I have no cause to believe that the thoughts are (a) about anything or (b) true or that (c) any of my inferences are logically valid. If the thoughts or inferences are caused biochemically, they will be caused whether or not they are about anything, are true, or are valid. They are no more meaningful than burps or the sound of sawing. They are non-rational elements in causal chains.

Similarly, if something is right because it is willed by God, it will be right regardless of whether a chain of reasoning can prove its status as God’s will. It cannot be right both because it is rational and because it is God’s will. That would give it two grounds for its status, and two independent grounds cannot interact in such a way, particularly where one cause, the chain of reasoning, by its nature, is inherently fallible. This is like saying I did not go to the beach (a) because it was raining and (b) because the bus was cancelled (assuming there is no connection between the rain and the cancellation). Either I would not have got there in sunny weather, either, in which case the rain is irrelevant, or I would have stayed at home even if the bus were running, in which case the bus is irrelevant. Both cannot be grounds.

Similarly, when I explain to someone else why something, which is God’s will, is rational, I am really saying my reason is my god. That puts the other person in their place. I have stopped doing this. That is why ‘yes’ means ‘yes’ and ‘no’ means ‘no’, and that is the end of it. When someone explains, for instance, why they are cancelling, hoping that their rational explanation will be both convincing and comforting, they are wrong: they are really saying: to see you would be irrational; and this is insulting. One is being asked to bow to the other person’s reason. If someone says, ‘It is not God’s will,’ I can bow to that, precisely because it is God’s will: God knows best for me and you, and if you have discerned that, I must trust that, prima facie. Hence: never justify, never explain, never defend, never try to sell God’s will on any basis other than the fact it is God’s will, and never try to comfort someone because they do not like God’s apparent will by using reason to do. One must simply stay silent in the face of it.

Moreover, since anything but the plain evil or nonsensical can be argued for as well as against, using reason, let us leave reason out of it altogether. I could argue why I should stay in my job or leave, see a friend or not, learn Javanese or not, go and live in the Alps or not. As many plainly wrong courses of action—perhaps many more—are devised rationally and with a sincere desire to do the right thing as are prompted by malice or uncontrolled impulse.

Hence: I will no longer try to reason out courses of action. I just ask and listen, and that is it.